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The Racialism and Erasure of Academic Freedom 
Nick J. Sciullo* 
Academic freedom is the cornerstone of democratic education.  A 
vigorous defense of academic freedom demands a vigorous investigation of 
freedom’s limitations.  Today we grapple with the lingering legacies of the 
USA PATRIOT Act,1 NSA spying,2 and aggressive law enforcement 
surveillance regimes.  The unfettered libertarian freedom many lionize is at 
best elusive.  While the question of what constitutes academic freedom 
should be of central interest to academics, the related question of how 
academics mitigate academic freedom is perhaps more interesting. 
Professor Stanley Fish and Dean Robert C. Post passionately 
demonstrate the need for academic freedom’s vigorous defense.3  Their 
recent texts and talks illustrate a salient debate about what it means to be an 
academic, and what it means to be free.  Fish’s recent discussion in the 
Opinionator, the online opinion companion of the New York Times, 
demonstrates both the value of academic freedom as well as, based upon the 
comments section, the healthy debate that supports and occludes this 
freedom.4  But, more interesting yet, is the ways in which race elides careful 
examination in academic freedom discussions. 
Race (still) matters.  Over fifty-five years ago, Ralph Ellison warned of 
the blindness in United States culture that obscured difference, in favor of a 
complex politics of colorblindness.5  He feared black people were at risk of 
“becoming quite dull and grey.”6  Discussions of academic freedom often 
suggest a blindness that occludes considerations of the ways in which 
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1 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and 
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2 Heidi Kitrosser, “Macro-Transparency” as Structural Directive: A Look at the NSA 
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3 See STANLEY FISH, SAVE THE WORLD ON YOUR OWN TIME (Oxford University Press 2008); 
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6 Id. at 436. 
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academic freedom discussions affect people of color and those who 
research and write in critical race paradigms. 
While the expansion of law reviews and online companions has 
opened doors to more critically engaged scholarship, as well as non-
traditional scholarship, one must remember much critical race scholarship 
still appears in less prestige law reviews.  Even if critical race scholarship is 
seen as more mainstream now, there remains a view that positions critical 
scholarship as somehow less worthy than traditional doctrinal and 
theoretical scholarship. 
Promotion and tenure committees often view race scholarship as lesser 
quality than First Amendment, property, or M&A work.  Detrimental as 
well is the loss of personal satisfaction from placement in top journals.  
Indeed, the ways in which any placement affects a scholar’s chance at 
tenure is no small consideration.  Scholars may be stigmatized as  
“crits” or “not serious scholars.”  Without expanding the ways in which 
scholarship is considered relative to promotion and tenure as well as general 
epistemological orientations and contributions to law and the academy, 
much critical race scholarship might remain marginalized.  How free are 
academics, particularly non-tenured academics, to pursue their research 
when race scholarship is maligned? 
In closing, we should ask not only what academic freedom means 
today and how we protect it, but also how academic freedom may be 
experienced differently by scholars of color and those writing from critical 
race perspectives. 
 
